Christopher Hibbert
The Destruction of Lord Raglan:
A tragedy of the Crimean War, 1854–55
Paperback: 338 pages
Wordsworth Editions 1999 (1961)
Stan dobry używany, srodek czysty, zdjęcie wystawionego egz.
The Destruction of Lord Raglan: A tragedy of the Crimean War, 1854–55 is a non-fiction historical work by Christopher Hibbert, originally published by Longman in 1961. The work is a portrait of Lord Raglan, commander-in-chief of British forces during the Crimean War. Drawing on contemporary letters, papers, and diaries Hibbert re-assesses both Raglan and the war, suggesting that the chaos of the conflict was the tragic result, not of one man's neglect, but of the whole nation's folly.
A Must-read Military Biography and History
By Robert Mosher on October 31, 2008
The Crimean War brought the armies of Britain, France, Turkey, Russia, and eventually Sardinia (Italy) to fight on the shores of the Black Sea's Crimean Peninsula. One product of this conflict was the creation of tens of thousands of letters, personal memoirs, official histories, and modern accounts of the battles and the related war that today fill the shelves of the world's libraries, archives, and perhaps even today its attics. This resulted in great part not only from the efforts of Mr. Russell of The London Times, the first modern war correspondent, and his colleagues, but also from the many literate veterans of this conflict, especially from England. The Crimean War was probably the first war to produce so many accounts from the soldiers in the ranks instead of just the army commanders and senior officers. With such raw material to work with it is little wonder that the library on the Crimean War has continued to grow as historians continued to work through it. Over his career, historian Christopher Hibbert has written many excellent works recounting the history and/or biography of places, events, and individuals both British and non-British. He presented his contribution on the Crimean war in 1961 in the form of this biography/military history centered upon the role the of the British Army's Commander, Lord Raglan, before and during the war in the Crimea. Curiously, Hibbert's book appeared at about the time that I first read Cecil Woodham-Smith's "The Reason Why" and discovered the body of scholarship on this conflict that was relatively forgotten and unknown in the United States at that time. Woodham-Smith's work was an important contribution to scholarship and popular literature on the war, first published in 1953, and telling the story of the Charge of the Light Brigade at the Battle of Balaclava (immortalized in Lord Tennyson's poem, The Charge of the Light Brigade). I really regret that it took me this long to discover Hibbert's book because having finally read it I consider "The Destruction of Lord Raglan" to be one of the best English-language histories of the Crimean War. If you want to study this conflict, you have to include `Lord Raglan' in your readings. Published almost 50 years ago, Hibbert's work obviously does not reflect the scholarship of recent years. However, he was the first author to make extensive use of Lord Raglan's own correspondence and papers in both the Royal Archives at Windsor Castle, but also those held at the Royal United Services Institute. In his acknowledgements, the author makes further note of the many other sources upon which he drew in researching Lord Raglan and the Crimean War. The Sources listed in the published work extend for almost eight pages and include English, French, and Russian language sources. Christopher Hibbert writes that no one interested in learning and writing about the Crimean War can avoid W.A. Kinglake's masterful nine volume history, "The Invasion of the Crimea," published 1[zasłonięte]877-18. Having discovered "The Destruction of Lord Raglan," I would dare to amend his advice to add, "nor can the serious student of this conflict ignore Christopher Hibbert's "The Destruction of Lord Raglan."
A textbook case of military and government incompetence
By John Duncan on September 7, 2011
First I should say that the copy I'm reviewing is the one I bought in 1967 (for 6 shillings, or about 40 US cents!). However, there is nothing in the description of the edition currently offered (at prices from $21.30 up) to suggest that the text has been changed, so I shall assume that my copy reflects what is in the edition of 1999. The Crimean War has long been a textbook case of the incompetence of the British generals in fighting the war, and of the incompetence of the government at home at keeping them properly supplied. The Charge of the Light Brigade is the most famous example of a military disaster, but it occupies less than six pages in a book of nearly 400, and is just one of many disasters caused by incompetence. Similar examples have, no doubt, occurred through history, but the Crimean War is special because it was the first war of modern journalism, with a war correspondent from the (London) Times present throughout, and sending regular reports. Earlier wars (and to some degree of later ones, for which there was much more stringent censorship of newspapers than existed on the British side at Crimea) tend to be seen through the eyes of the victorious generals, who have a natural tendency to emphasize their successes and downplay their failures. Nor do they stress the incompetence of their defeated enemies, because it is more impressive to win against fierce and well organized troops than against feeble ones. The publication of military secrets in the Times was certainly the cause of some of the British problems -- "We have no need of spies", said the Tsar, "we have the Times" -- but it hardly explains everything. The French made mistakes as well, but on the whole they did much better, not only in the actual fighting, but also in their supply of food, clothing and war materials, and organization of their hospitals and medical services. They still had a recognizable army when much of the British army was little more than a rabble. A large part of the British problem was due to the fact that almost none of the senior officers and few of the other officers had any experience at all of fighting a war. Those junior officers who had fought in India were held in contempt and their opinions given little weight, because, unlike the senior officers, they were career officers rather than rich aristocratic amateurs. In the French army things were different: their generals also had little or no experience of fighting a war in Europe, but they did have experience of a colonial war in Algeria, and were not just rich amateurs. Although the war was eventually won, when the French finally took the naval port of Sevastopol, it was obvious by the end that many things had gone badly wrong, so someone had to be blamed. Although many of the mistakes had been made in London, the politicians of the day were no keener on recognizing their errors than politicians ever are, and preferred to concentrate on the inadequacy of the army, which was real enough, though it had been called "the finest army that has ever left these shores" when it set out for the Crimea, and to seek scapegoats among the generals. Although there were some good candidates for the title of worst general, most notably Lord Cardigan of the Light Brigade, most of the blame fell on one who least deserved it, the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Raglan, who had in his youth fought under the Duke of Wellington in Spain and at Waterloo, where he had lost an arm. Christopher Hibbert's book is in part a biography of Lord Raglan, in which he shows that in reality he was a far better general than he had been given credit for, and in part a history of the Crimean War itself, mainly from the British point of view, but by no means neglecting the French. All in all it provides a fascinating account, with lessons that are by no means irrelevant to warfare today.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Christopher Hibbert MC (5 March 1924 – 21 December 2008), born Arthur Raymond Hibbert, was an English writer, historian and biographer. He has been called "a pearl of biographers" (New Statesman) and "probably the most widely-read popular historian of our time and undoubtedly one of the most prolific" (The Times).[1] Hibbert was a Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature and the author of many books, including The Story of England, Disraeli, Edward VII,George IV, The Rise and Fall of the House of Medici, and Cavaliers and Roundheads.
In 1924 Arthur Raymond Hibbert was born in Enderby, Leicestershire, the son of Canon H. V. Hibbert (died 1980) and his wife Maude, and was educated at Radley College, before he went up to Oriel College at the University of Oxford.[1][2] He was awarded the degrees of B.A. and later MA. He left Oriel College to join the Army, where a sergeant major referred to Hibbert as Christopher Robin based upon his youthful looks. The name "Christopher" subsequently stuck. Hibbert served as an infantry officer in the London Irish Rifles regiment in Italy during World War II, reaching the rank of captain. He was wounded twice and awarded the Military Cross in 1945.[2][3] Hibbert became the personal assistant to General Alan Duff. From 1945 to 1959 he was a partner in a firm of land agents and auctioneers,[1] and began his writing career in 1957.[3]
Hibbert was awarded the Heinemann Award for Literature in 1962 for The Destruction of Lord Raglan,[2] and the McColvin Medal of the Library Association in 1989. Christopher Hibbert was a Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature and the Royal Geographical Society, and was awarded an Honorary Doctorate in Literature by theUniversity of Leicester.
Hibbert was a member of the Army and Navy Club and the Garrick Club. He lived at Henley-on-Thames, Oxfordshire. He was married to Susan Piggford with three children, his daughter and literary executor Kate Hibbert, television writer James Hibbert and music journalist Tom Hibbert.[2]
He died on 21 December 2008 in Henley-on-Thames from bronchial pneumonia at the age of 84.[1][2][3] He was cremated after a humanist ceremony in Oxford on 2 January 2009, and was survived by his wife and their three children.[4]
