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Strategy for Defeat. The Luftwaffe 1[zasłonięte]933-19 Wrocł

21-02-2015, 21:26
Aukcja w czasie sprawdzania nie była zakończona.
Cena kup teraz: 41 zł     
Użytkownik Art-Bellum
numer aukcji: 5020128156
Miejscowość Wrocław
Wyświetleń: 1   

Dodatkowe informacje:
Stan: Używany
Okładka: miękka
Rok wydania (xxxx): 1983
Kondycja: bez śladów używania
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Murray W., Strategy for Defeat. The Luftwaffe 1[zasłonięte]933-19, Air University Press 1983 ISBN – 158[zasłonięte]0108

This is a "big picture" view of the European air war. It is not a collection of personal stories or battle accounts, but rather an analysis of how decisions at the highest levels about material and resources dictated the outcome in what became a titanic war of attrition. This book will contribute substantially to anyone's understanding of the war.

Murray makes a strong case, reinforced throughout the book, that German decisions about aircraft production made in 1940 essentially spelled the doom of the Luftwaffe in later years. Failure to mobilize their industry to maximize aircraft production early on, he argues, meant that the Germans never were able to meet the logistical challenges posed by the Allied air forces.

In his narrative of the war, Murray points out numerous cases where the senior German leadership made the wrong decision about production and allocation of resources. Not only did they fail to produce enough aircraft but they also failed to produce the right kinds of planes. In addition, Luftwaffe forces were wasted in many efforts that did not contribute substantially to the vital missions of the war.

The book also contains summaries of the same aspects of the British and American air forces, and thus is an excellent summary of the essential elements of the technological war of attrition, that, Murray argues, played a large role in the overall outcome of the conflict.

The reader should already have a good general knowledge of World War II in Europe to fully appreciate the insights in this work. Murray's book definitely will enhance your understanding of all aspects of the great European air war. One comes away from this book with the feeling, also supported by other works, that Hitler, Goering and other high Nazi officials probably never fully comprehended that they had begun a world war that would pit them against economies that Germany never could match.

Książka w oprawie miękkiej, stan dobry plus, s. 365